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Abstract: International competitiveness is often regarded as crucial for the attainment of gains from trade, which may 
lead policy makers to subsidize exports. This view is based on confusion between the concepts of competitive and 
comparative advantage. The paper argues that when comparative advantage is defined and measured appropriately, not 
limiting it to the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models, it becomes a necessary condition for the attainment of gains 
from trade and it applies to all forms of trade that lead to economy-wide gains. The paper proceeds by reviewing first the 
concepts and measurements of comparative and competitive advantage. It shows that in order to result in economy-wide 
benefits, known as gains from trade, trade needs to be based on comparative advantage. It also points to implications for 
the design of trade and industrial policies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 International competitiveness has gained much attention 
in the business literature as well as among policy makers in 
recent years. One of the leading advocates for the importance 
of the concept and its measurement is Michael Porter. As the 
title of Porter’s original book [1] suggests, the concept of 
competitive advantage
1
 is given an economy-wide 
dimension. Although it mainly applies at the firm level, it is 
also used by Porter and others to analyse competitiveness at 
the national level and to recommend trade and industrial 
policies. This is unfortunate as it diverts attention away from 
the original concept of comparative advantage and tends to 
blind policy makers to the fact that the true benefits of trade 
to economies depend on comparative rather than competitive 
advantage. 
 The confusion between competitive and comparative 
advantage is also visible in the mainstream literature on 
international economics, which distinguishes ‘comparative 
advantage trade’ and ‘other trade not based on comparative 
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1The terms competitiveness and competitive advantage are being used here 
synonymously, as in Porter [1]. 
2This distinction is made in most textbooks on international trade. It is most 
explicit in Gerber [2], where intra-industry trade is introduced under the 
heading “Beyond comparative advantage” and it is stated that “a large share 
of international trade is not based on comparative advantage”. 
exports and of comparative disadvantage for imports, and 
that competitive without comparative advantage will not lead 
to gains from trade.
3
 It also shows that the concept of 
comparative advantage applies to all forms of trade, 
irrespective of the different sources of comparative 
advantage. When reviewing the various attempts of 
measuring comparative advantage, one realizes the 
importance of distinguishing competitive from comparative 
advantage and their different sources, in particular with 
regard to the gains from trade. Socio-economic net benefits 
arise only when specialization and trade are based on 
comparative advantage, not on simple cost competitiveness. 
If one subscribes to the general definition of comparative 
advantage, rather than the more restricted definition linking 
it strictly to productivity and/or endowment differences, it 
follows that intra-industry trade also requires comparative 
advantage in order to benefit an economy. 
 The paper proceeds by first clarifying the difference 
between comparative and competitive advantage, as well as 
their measurement. In section 3 it is shown that the 
attainment of gains from trade in the socio-economic sense 
requires comparative advantage. In section 4 it is argued that 
in intra-industry trade comparative advantage comes from 
economies of scale combined with other factors of location. 
Section 5 deals with some of the potential policy 
implications and section 6 concludes. 
2. COMPETITIVENESS AND COMPARATIVE ADV-
ANTAGE REVISITED 
 The statement that “trade is driven by comparative 
advantage” is often heard and rarely contested. In a strict 
                                                           
3This holds notwithstanding second-best arguments that under certain 
conditions export subsidies can be welfare-improving, such as Brander and 
Spencer [3]. 
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sense, however, it is misleading. In real-world economies, in 
which policy-induced and other distortions exist, trade is 
driven by the profit motive and cost competitiveness (for 
exports) or the lack of it (for imports). Clearly, firms or 
industries are exporting products and services when they are 
able to compete with foreign suppliers. However, 
competitiveness does not necessarily lead to gains from trade 
for the whole economy, because exports may be profitable 
due to subsidies or other beneficial distortions. In that case 
the gains from trade may be completely or partially 
cancelled. 
 Since the seminal paper of Dornbusch, Fisher and 
Samuelson [4] we know that the extension of the 
comparative advantage paradigm from the two-good to the 
n-good case requires the introduction of prices and monetary 
costs. We also know that the notion of opportunity cost is 
ambiguous in the real world of multiple products and that in 
the presence of multiple products it needs to be replaced by 
the requirement of undistorted equilibrium prices. When the 
observable prices are not distortion-free a cost advantage can 
only be described as cost competitiveness, not comparative 
advantage. This follows from the following argument, based 
on the Ricardian model extended to multiple products. In this 
model industries are competitive when their relative labour 
productivity exceeds the relative wage. When the general 
wage level rises beyond its equilibrium level it is possible 
that the country loses competitive advantage in all activities. 
That, however, is not possible for comparative advantage, by 
nature of the very concept. But it is possible that all activities 
are, temporarily, non-competitive. In other words, the 
nominal changes of prices, wages or the exchange rate out of 
equilibrium affect only competitive but not comparative 
advantage. 
 It is common in the presentation of the Ricardian trade 
model to derive equilibrium wages from the prices under 
free trade. In the Ricardian model extended to n products it is 
the relative equilibrium wage that represents the dividing 
line between activities that have comparative advantage and 
those that have not. When applying the condition that 
relative labour productivity (relative to the foreign one) 
needs to exceed the relative wage, it is silently assumed that 
the wages need to be undistorted equilibrium wages; 
otherwise the condition can only be called cost 
competitiveness: 
a w < a* w* or a*/a > w/w* (competitiveness)                  (1) 
a we < a* we* or a*/a > we/we* (comparative advantage),     (2) 
where a and a* are domestic and foreign (*) labour input per 
unit of output, w and w* are domestic and foreign wage rates 
and we and we* are undistorted equilibrium wage rates. In 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model it is the direct correspondence 
between relative product and factor prices in equilibrium that 
allows us to determine the equilibrium factor prices which 
lead to gains from trade. The fact that the equilibrium nature 
of factor prices is often not underlined derives from the 
nature of reasoning, which is based on the two-sector general 
equilibrium model under perfect competition, full 
employment and free trade. It needs to be stated, however, 
that in the real world product and factor prices are not 
necessarily equilibrium prices and need to be adjusted in 
order to be usable for the determination of comparative 
advantage.
4
 This leads to a further source of controversy, the 
neglect of measurement of comparative and competitive 
advantage.  
 The failure to distinguish the two concepts, of 
competitive and comparative advantage, has had several 
consequences. With respect to competitiveness, the absence 
of a well-established concept has led to a multitude of 
definitions in the literature, which was surveyed recently [5]. 
Many indicators have been proposed and those of a macro-
economic perspective, such as the method used by the World 
Economic Forum in its annual World Competitiveness 
Report [6], differ distinctly from the original meaning of 
competitive advantage (cost competitiveness) in the 
microeconomic sense. With regard to comparative 
advantage, the official discourse of trade theory has 
continued to explain the concept strictly in Ricardian terms, 
i.e. with reference to two goods and one factor of production. 
The extension to more than two products and to more than 
one factor, in the framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
theory, is acknowledged but usually not pursued in terms of 
measurement. The comparative advantage principle applied 
to the Heckscher-Ohlin model requires that in autarchy the 
domestic prices differ from foreign or international ones. 
Since trade leads to the equalization of prices this difference 
disappears and comparative advantage becomes supposedly 
un-measurable. But does it mean that comparative advantage 
does not exist once trade takes place? And is it really un-
measurable in a post-trade context? 
2.1. Indicators of Competitiveness and Comparative 
Advantage 
 Bela Balassa recognized in his often quoted paper on 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) [7], that the 
measurement of a comparative cost advantage by 
comparison between domestic and foreign prices under 
autarchy was impossible in reality, since autarchy prices are 
usually not observable. He proposed therefore to measure 
comparative advantage by help of the export performance of 
different activities. This proposal contributed to perpetuate 
the confusion between competitiveness and comparative 
advantage. Clearly, export performance in the context of 
distorted prices reflects cost competitiveness and not 
comparative advantage. It does not imply gains from trade to 
the economy. Therefore, the RCA measures competitive, but 
not comparative advantage. 
 The only rigorous measure of comparative advantage that 
has survived over time is the Domestic Resource Cost 
(DRC) ratio, proposed first by Michael Bruno [8]. It 
compares the cost of primary factor inputs with the 
corresponding value added, all computed at shadow prices. 
Its only disadvantage is that it enters the potential price 
advantage of intermediate inputs only indirectly through the 
denominator. Clearly, intermediate inputs can be a source of 
comparative advantage. For tradable inputs it can be argued 
                                                           
4The procedure requires estimation of shadow prices, just like in social cost-
benefit analysis. 
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that their equilibrium prices are international prices and 
therefore the abundance of tradable raw materials cannot 
constitute a source of comparative advantage. This is 
debatable, but in the presence of transport cost the 
abundance or scarcity of resource inputs can lead to regional 
price differences even if they are tradable. For non-tradable 
intermediate inputs the argument clearly applies. For 
instance, abundant and low-cost domestic electricity supply 
can be a source of comparative advantage, especially in 
energy-intensive industries. 
 The preceding argument has led us to propose a full-cost 
measure of comparative advantage, which divides total cost 
of production by the output value (or price), both at shadow 
prices, and which we have called Unit Cost ratio at shadow 
prices (UCRs) [9]. This indicator lends itself also to a 
decomposition of the corresponding measure of domestic 
cost competitiveness (UCRd) into components of 
comparative advantage and various sources of distortion, in 
particular exchange rate misalignment, rates of protection of 
output and input prices, as well as various distortions of 
primary input prices (i.e. wage rates and the cost of capital). 
While these indicators are often difficult to apply, given their 
extensive data requirements and the necessity to estimate 
shadow prices of all inputs and outputs that are prone to 
price distortions, they highlight the crucial difference 
between competitiveness under protection, subsidies and/or 
other distortions on the one hand, and comparative 
advantage on the other hand. The distinction is of great 
importance, when it comes to industrial policies, public 
investment criteria and especially in the context of policies 
in favour of sustainable development. 
 One often wonders why the measurement of comparative 
advantage has not attracted more interest in the past, barring 
few exceptions,
5
 and has not led to the establishment of 
generally accepted indicators for the use in econometric 
studies of trade. The reason is probably the philosophy that 
underlies most works in mainstream economic theory. It 
places much confidence in markets, even when markets are 
possibly imperfect or failing. Governments are rightly said to 
be not competent in “picking winners”, which means 
identifying those activities that have potential comparative 
advantage. But it is also true that de facto all governments 
engage in some forms of industrial policy. This means that 
better information about distortions of all kinds, about 
competitiveness and comparative advantage would help in 
choosing better policies, especially in the context of 
globalization and the pursuit of socio-economic objectives. 
We shall return to this issue in the section on policy 
implications. 
3. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE GAINS 
FROM TRADE 
 It is well established in the literature that comparative 
advantage leads to gains from trade, meaning benefits to the 
whole economy. This may be interpreted as stating that 
comparative advantage is a sufficient condition for gains 
                                                           
5Most notable exceptions are [10] and [11], as well as replies and extensions 
in the same journal (WWA 1985,121(2), 351-4 and WWA 1986, 122(2), 
379-81). 
form trade to occur. The question that remains to be 
addressed is whether comparative advantage is also a 
necessary condition for the attainment of gains from trade. In 
other words: Can trade without comparative advantage lead 
to gains from trade? 
 The argument that comparative advantage is necessary 
for gains from trade to occur is easily demonstrated in the 
two-good framework of general equilibrium. In the standard 
diagram shown in Fig. (1) the real opportunity cost of 
producing either of the two goods, for instance that of X, 
which equals the slope of the production possibilities frontier 
(PPF), can be either lower or higher than the relative price of 
X at free trade (Px/Py)F. If it is higher, Y is an exportable, 
and if it is lower, X is an exportable. Since the original 
production point (A) in autarchy depends on preferences, A 
may lie on either side of the point QF, where production will 
take place under free trade. Here we assume that A lies to the 
right of QF, which determines that Y in this diagram is the 
exportable and X is the importable. When specialization in 
favour of the exportable occurs (move from A to QF) and 
free trade takes place, it is obvious that gains from trade 
occur, moving the consumption point up from A to a higher 
level of welfare such as at CF. 
 
Fig. (1). Trade with and without comparative advantage. 
 Under trade restrictions, for instance a tariff on imports, 
specialization would not move the production point to QF, 
but to any point to its right. For simplicity, we can assume 
that it remains at A. Trade can nevertheless take place and 
even some gains from trade (but less than under free trade) 
are possible as long as the exportable is exported 
(consumption points to the right of A). If, however, the 
importable is exported and the exportable imported, the 
consumption point would lie to the left of A and the ‘gains 
from trade’ would clearly be negative as the consumption 
point would lie inside the PPF and on a lower indifference 
curve than at A. It is clear in this case that the necessary 
condition is the same for the gains from trade and 
comparative advantage. Trading against comparative 
advantage will clearly not lead to positive gains from trade. 
 In the case of more than two products this simple 
demonstration breaks down because opportunity cost is no 
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introduction of prices and monetary costs, which in turn 
leads to the important distinction between competitive and 
comparative advantage. Also, the foregoing analysis assumes 
that costs are endogenous, such that the factor prices are 
domestic equilibrium prices determined by endowments and 
the demands resulting from domestic consumption and trade, 
although product prices are allowed to be policy-determined. 
It does not allow us to deal with the more realistic case of 
exogenously determined factor prices. In this case it is 
possible to find industries that have comparative advantage 
(exportables) but are unable to export due to non-competitive 
costs. It is therefore useful to apply unit cost analysis and to 
introduce the concept of international cost competitiveness 
or competitive advantage, meaning that unit costs at market 
prices are inferior to the international product price. The 
question to be examined is again whether gains from trade 
require comparative advantage. 
 By definition, importables are products whose costs at 






 > 1,             (3) 
where UC refers to unit costs and the superscripts S and F 
refer to shadow and free trade prices, respectively, and where 
the former imply the absence of any distortion and the latter 
are assumed to be distortion-free. Now let us take the case of 
an importable product, and assume that its producer, in spite 
of absence of comparative advantage, succeeds in exporting 
with profit, due to costs in domestic prices that are inferior or 





  1,            (4) 
where the superscript D refers to (possibly distorted) 
domestic prices. 





 > 1  UCMD / PM UCM F              (5) 
can hold only if the unit costs in domestic prices(UCM
D
) are 
inferior to those at shadow prices (UCM
S
). This is highly 
unlikely since intermediate inputs tend to be cheaper under 
liberalization and so is the cost of capital. While normally 
UCM
D
 tends to be larger than UCM
S





 ), could achieve this 
result. However, such a subsidy would reduce the level of 
welfare and more than cancel the gains from trade, since the 
expected trade benefits are in the same order as the cost 
reduction when moving from autarchy to free trade. It 
follows that the gains from trade require comparative 
advantage. 
 Now consider the case of an exportable product, which 
under free trade has unit costs that are lower or equal to the 
international price, but which we assume to be non-





  1 < UCXD / PXF.          (6) 
 To make this kind of trade profitable the losses would 
have to be compensated by subsidies, which would cancel 
the gains from trade. We conclude again that the 
achievement of gains from trade requires comparative 
advantage.
 
3.1. Limitations and Extensions of the Analysis 
 This demonstration corresponds to the conventional 
analysis of tariffs and subsidies in a static general-
equilibrium framework. It excludes dynamic effects and 
therefore dynamic gains from trade, which may possibly 
outweigh the potential welfare gains or losses from 
subsidization. Three kinds of dynamic gains can occur from 
exports: (a) diminished cost due to larger-scale production 
following trade liberalization, (b) diminished cost through 
learning by exporting and (c) access to new technology 
gained by way of increased imports, which in turn are made 
possible through increased exports. The achievement of such 
dynamic gains opens the door for the possibility that 
industries that presently have no comparative advantage be 
subsidized, allowing them to develop comparative advantage 
over time. The argument is familiar from the discussion of 
infant industry protection. On the other hand, the gains from 
trade are likely to be reduced when other objectives are 
factored into the social welfare function, such as 
environmental protection. The quantification of such effects 
is known to be difficult. 
 The arguments above apply of course to trade in general 
and they need to be considered in a complete evaluation of 
the gains from trade. In the present context they only modify 
but do not reverse our argument that without comparative 
advantage there cannot be gains from trade. Using the 
method of measuring comparative advantage that we have 
championed in the past, an industry in which the total cost at 
shadow prices exceeds the sum of private and social benefits, 
and which is made competitive by way of subsidies, cannot 
have positive net benefits, as demonstrated above. 
4. ECONOMIES OF SCALE, INTRA-INDUSTRY 
TRADE AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
 Economies of scale are not generally recognized as a 
source of comparative advantage. The reason for this may be 
the fact that scale economies are an industry characteristic 
and not a country characteristic. Since large markets tend to 
attract large plants and industries featuring economies of 
scale, Tybout argued, “…bigger economies have bigger 
plants, so large domestic markets may confer a competitive 
advantage on potential exporters through internal increasing 
returns to scale” [12]. As the author also reports gains from 
trade through specialization in large-scale production it 
follows that the increased competitiveness may translate into 
comparative advantage. Other authors who describe 
economies of scale as a source of comparative advantage are 
Markusen et al. [13]. 
 As scale economies are a characteristic of industries in 
the same sense as capital intensity or labour intensity, they 
apply to industries independent of their location. In 
combination with country-specific attributes, such as country 
size or taste biases, they can generate comparative 
advantage. It must be conceded that as a source of 
comparative advantage economies of scale act differently 
from labour or capital abundance in that they are less ex-
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ante. They become factual only once the producers have 
chosen the location of production and the plant size. Let us 
now see how comparative advantage arises in intra-industry 
trade. 
 The model that simulates most cogently the forces 
leading to intra-industry trade is the monopolistic 
competition model developed by Helpman and Krugman 
[14]. This model is based on two important assumptions, 
those of differentiated (brand name) products implying 
monopolistic competition, and of economies of scale, which 
in turn derive from fixed start-up costs. Intra-industry trade 
arises in this model when firms producing brand-name 
products will rather produce in large-scale plants in one 
country and supply other countries by exporting than 
producing in smaller plants in various locations. Countries 
can therefore be exporters and importers of the same type of 
product if the homes of different brands are not all located in 
the same country. Where the home base of each brand is 
located is not explained by the model; nor does the model 
explain the location of the surviving plants when markets 
become integrated. There are other theories, however, which 
can provide an explanation of industry location, and which 
add to historical contingency. Taste patterns or preferences, 
for instance, can determine the origin of certain product 
brands. This approach has been further extended into a trade 
theory by Linder [15]. 
 The essence of the intra-industry trade model is that the 
production of differentiated products will take place where 
the average cost is lowest and at the largest possible scale. 
Countries that either develop such industries or succeed in 
attracting them, can therefore derive comparative advantage 
based on scale economies, as long as comparative advantage 
is measured by comparative costs, as it should be, in line 
with the history of the concept. The model also reflects 
monopolistic competition, which results from product 
differentiation into brand-name products. The competition 
between the producers of different brands of similar products 
takes the form of mixed price/attribute competition. This 
raises the question whether comparative costs and, thereby, 
comparative advantage apply to differentiated products. It is 
possible that some of the rejections of comparative 
advantage in intra-industry trade may be based on a negative 
answer to this question. In our view, the comparison of costs 
of differentiated products poses no particular problem as it 
exists in inter-industry trade as well. Quality differences 
exist even in so-called homogeneous products; in other 
words, perfect homogeneity is rarely observable. Quality 
differences are then overcome by assuming that they are 
taken into account by product prices. In the measurement of 
competitiveness and comparative advantage discussed 
earlier, differences in product quality are taken into account 
by the particular definition of unit cost ratios, which divide 
total costs by the value of output. Higher quality or 
additional product attributes tend to increase both costs and 
the price. Consequently, unit cost ratios are comparable 
across differentiated products. It follows therefore that when 
comparative advantage (CA) is defined in the correct 
comprehensive way, i.e. not limited to Ricardian or HO-type 
sources, it applies as well to intra-industry trade and the 
distinction between CA-trade and non-CA-trade is 
meaningless. 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 The distinction and measurement of competitive and 
comparative advantage are not only important from an 
academic point of view; they are important for the rational 
design of industrial policies. It is often argued that industrial 
policies have no place in market-driven economies. 
Nevertheless, in nearly all countries governments de facto 
engage in industrial policies, either purposefully or 
accidentally by pursuing other goals. Often the outcome of 
such processes is a set of policies that is sub-optimal with 
regard to longer-term sustainable development. The pursuit 
of socio-economic objectives requires evaluation of benefits 
and costs, and in the context of international trade this 
amounts to information on competitiveness and comparative 
advantage. The following examples demonstrate the validity 
of this argument. 
 In a study of Kenyan manufacturing industries [16] it was 
found that several industries, which had comparative 
advantage, based on the unit cost ratio measurement, were 
unable to compete internationally, due to high costs. These 
costs were essentially the consequence of distortions 
imposed by government policies and the absence of 
compensation. Among the largest cost distortions were the 
cost of capital (due to extensive government borrowing), 
exchange rate overvaluation, excessive transport costs (due 
to decaying infrastructure), excessive energy costs (due to 
frequent electricity blackouts), as well as communication 
costs (due to failing telephone lines). Corrective or 
compensating policies could have helped these industries 
realize their comparative advantage and to compete 
internationally. Instead, we found that for a majority of 
manufacturing industries their international competitiveness 
had declined from the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, in 
spite of some evidence of trade liberalisation during this 
period. These cases demonstrate the importance of analysing 
comparative and competitive advantages for the purpose of 
designing industrial strategies. 
 In an illuminating debate by Lin and Chang [17] the 
authors refer to cases of industries in Japan, South Korea and 
Finland, which exemplify the role of government support for 
technological upgrading. While agreeing on the value of 
such support for growth and development they disagree on 
the extent to which industrial strategies could deviate, 
temporarily, from comparative advantage in order to 
generate competitiveness in the future. The missing link in 
this debate, however, is measurement. Without 
quantification the impact of government support for future 
industrial champions remains ambiguous. 
 Are such arguments valid with regard to intra-industry 
trade as well? Take the case of a developing country 
interested in regional integration, the expansion of regional 
trade and industrialization. Also assume that the industrial 
structure of the country and its regional neighbours is very 
similar, due to similar resource endowment and similar 
industry policies in the past. Therefore, while chances for 
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expanding inter-industry trade are limited, this is not the case 
for intra-industry trade. The leading industries, textile and 
food industries, as well as metal products, offer possibilities 
of specialization in different products. This may not happen 
automatically, but encouragement and some support may 
then help to generate intra-industry trade, and the 
consequence can be production in larger plants and lower 
costs due to economies of scale. The context described may 
apply to the East African countries, Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, who are in the process of 
developing a common market and possibly an economic 
union. An example of success in a different context, the one 
of Canada, is the Canada-US Auto Pact of the 1960s, in 
which the establishment of industry-specific free trade led to 
restructuring of the industry, significant cost decline and 
intra-industry trade between Canada and the US. 
6. CONCLUSION 
 The present paper is motivated by two observations: 
First, the often heard claim that international competitiveness 
is the key to economy-wide gains, which leads to 
subsidization of exports. Second, the widely accepted 
division between comparative advantage trade and other 
trade not based on comparative advantage, in particular intra-
industry trade. Both views are based on an overly narrow 
interpretation of comparative advantage, limiting it to 
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin-type models, as well as on 
confusion between competitive and comparative advantage. 
It has been argued here that the two concepts are closely 
related, can be measured by unit cost/price ratios and differ 
only by the use of shadow prices, or undistorted equilibrium 
prices, in the case of comparative advantage. If this 
requirement is not met, economy-wide gains from trade are 
not guaranteed and policy makers may be led to subsidize 
importables in order to export, or to impose cost distortions 
on exportables preventing them to be exported. It is also 
shown that when the cost/price ratio definition is used to 
measure comparative advantage across differentiated 
products the comparative advantage principle applies to all 
forms of trade. 
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